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MEDIATION AND OKLAHOMA'S NEW
DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1983, Oklahoma's new Dispute Resolution Act became
operative.' The Act was passed in response to the increasing number
of mediation programs available in the state and a desire on the part of
mediation advocates to clarify legal issues such as mediator liability
and confidentiality, as well as to set legislative standards and guide-
lines in the field.2 Project Early Settlement, Tulsa's mediation pro-
gram, was a major factor in the city being chosen as a pilot site for the
American Bar Association's Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Centers
Program (Multi-Door Program)?
This Comment will discuss Project Early Settlement and the
I. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1801-06 (Supp. 1983). The Dispute Resolution Act gives
Oklahoma counties and municipalities the authority to establish mediation programs to be admin-
istered and supervised under the direction of the Administrative Director of the Courts. Id
§ 1803. Furthermore, the Administrative Director is to establish jurisdictional guidelines for me-
diation programs and to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
Id §§ 1803-04. Such rules are then subject to the approval of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Id
§ 1803. Rules prepared by the Administrative Office of the Judiciary were approved as to form by
the Oklahoma Supreme Court on January 16, 1984. Oklahoma Rules, Regulations and Guide-
lines for the Dispute Resolution Act (Oct. 1983). These rules provide for: (1) the establishment of
a Dispute Resolution Advisory Board to assist the Administrative Director of the Courts; (2) the
qualification of mediators; (3) a general outline of a referral policy to govern the referral of dis-
putes between dispute resolution programs; (4) the development of initial interview procedures;
(5) rules of practice for attorneys of clients involved in mediation; (6) a code of professional con-
duct for mediators; (7) procedures regarding continuances of criminal or civil actions to allow
parties to the action to pursue mediation; and (8) the submission of reports by dispute resolution
programs established under the authority of the Oklahoma Dispute Resolution Act to the Admin-
istrative Director of the Courts. Id. Rules 2, 4-10.
2. See Mitchell, Tulsa's Mediation Plan Helps Unclog Courts, J. REC., March 5, 1983, at 4;
ABA SPEC. COMM. ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, LEGISLATION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 127 (1984).
Among the mediation programs available in Oklahoma are: Dispute Services operated from the
psychology department at Oklahoma State University in Stillwater; Citizen's Dispute Settlement
Program operated under the Probation Services Division of Oklahoma City; and Project Early
Settlement initiated by the Municipal Court of the City of Tulsa. ABA SPEC. COMM. ON ALTER-
NATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM DIRECTORY 154-57 (L. Ray ed.
1983). See also ABA SPEC. COMM. ON ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Media-
tion Services 4vailable in Oklahoma, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Spring 1982, at 6 (discusses Dispute
Services and Project Early Settlement).
3. Speech by W. Riley, Reception for Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Centers Program,
Tulsa Club (June 22, 1983); see also Program May Settle Legal Disputes, Tulsa World, June 24,
1983, at 10, col. 3. Mr. Riley commented that the commitment local civic leaders have shown
toward Project Early Settlement and that program's success rate are what attracted the ABA to
choose Tulsa for Multi-Door. Id. at 10, col. 4.
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Multi-Door Program in relation to the concept of mediation. Inas-
much as a major function of the Multi-Door Program in Tulsa will be
the channeling of disputes into mediation, particularly Project Early
Settlement's mediation program, the second part of this discussion will
concentrate on mediation as a means of settling disputes and the effect
of Oklahoma's Dispute Resolution Act on mediation issues. These is-
sues include the confidentiality of mediation sessions, the enforceabil-
ity of mediation settlements, and the scope of mediator liability.
II. PROJECT EARLY SETTLEMENT AND THE MULTI-DOOR PROGRAM
The concept of dispute resolution centers was developed by Pro-
fessor Frank E. A. Sander and presented in 1976 at the National Con-
ference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice.4 Dispute resolution centers are intended to
act as "multi-door courthouse[s]" with "many doors directing dispu-
tants to the most appropriate dispute-resolution process."5 Ideally,
such a program would have one intake center which would direct com-
plaints to several different processes within the same building.6 These
processes could include arbitration, mediation, ombudsman,7 medical
malpractice screening, or small claims or juvenile court proceedings.'
Sander's proposal pointed out that the key feature of the multi-
door concept is intake screening, 9 the purpose of which is to analyze
4. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976). Professor Frank E.A.
Sander is a Bussey Professor of law at Harvard University and a member of the American Bar
Association Special Committee on Dispute Resolution.
5. Sander, The Multidoor Courthouse, 63 NAT'L FORUM-PHI KAPPA PHI J. 24, 25 (1983).
See also Sander, supra note 4, at 130-3 1, in which he states: "[wihat I am thus advocating is a
flexible and diverse panoply of dispute resolution processes, with particular types of cases being
assigned to differing processes."
6. ABA, Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Center, Tulsa, Oklahoma 2, (May 1983) (unpub-
lished report). Information throughout this Comment which was obtained from unpublished re-
ports and memoranda is available through the ABA, Spec. Committee on Dispute Resolution,
1800 M. Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. See also Sander, supra note 4, at 131 (examples of
processes which could be made available).
7. The ombudsman concept is one designed to deal with complaints against governmental
agencies, officials, and employees. The concept operates by having a public official screen and
investigate such complaints before making a recommendation as to resolution of the complaint.
See Frank, State Ombudsman Legislation in the United States, 29 U. MIAMi L. REv. 397, 397-98
(1975); see also Cooke, The Highways and Byways of Dispute Resolution, 55 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
611, 623 (1981) in which the author stated: "Complaints against governmental activities could be
processed through an ombudsman who would make recommendations for action through a milieu
of informal and speedy procedures."
8. See Sander, supra note 5, at 25; Sander, supra note 4, at 131.
9. See Sander, supra note 5, at 25. In fact, Sander notes that the success of the multidoor
courthouse will largely depend on the skill of the intake official and that one real danger of this
2
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the nature of a dispute in order to determine the most effective mecha-
nism for resolving it.' 0 In so directing a dispute, the program would
increase both the economic efficiency and the expeditious handling of
dispute settlement and, in turn, decrease citizen frustration in locating
the most appropriate mechanism for resolving conflicts."t
The American Bar Association became actively involved in the
study of alternative methods of dispute resolution through its sponsor-
ship of a national conference on Minor Dispute Resolution in 1977.12
Following this conference, the ABA established the Special Committee
on the Resolution of Minor Disputes, now called the Special Commit-
tee on Dispute Resolution. 3 The Committee "serves as the coordinat-
ing entity for alternative dispute resolution activity within the
American Bar Association"' 4 and has set forth five objectives which it
intends to promote: (1) providing comprehensive clearinghouse serv-
ices and technical assistance to all interested entities; (2) developing
and implementing a plan for increasing state and local bar involve-
ment; (3) conducting legal, judicial, and public education programs;
(4) developing law school curriculum; and (5) conducting research and
experimentation. 5 In furtherance of these goals, the Committee imple-
mented Sander's "multi-door courthouse" concept through the devel-
opment of a Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Centers Program.' 6 On
January 27, 1983, the ABA selected Tulsa and Houston as initial sites
for Multi-Door Centers.' 7 The District of Columbia was later added as
"administrative innovation" is the possibility of disputants being referred from one door to an-
other with no genuine effort to resolve their problems. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. One further advantage of the multidoor concept "is that is will help. . . to gain a
better understanding of the peculiar advantages and disadvantages of particular dispute-resolu-
tion processes for specific types of disputes." Id.
12. ABA, REPORT ON THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MINOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Intro-
duction (May 1977).
13. See Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 31 n. 13; ("The American Bar
Association sponsored a national conference on Minor Dispute Resolution in 1977 . . . [and]
subsequently established a Special Committee on the Resolution of Minor Disputes."); but see
ABA SPEc. COMM. ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MEDIATION
AND THE LAW: WILL REASON PREVAIL? Introduction (L. Ray ed. 1983) ("The Special Committee
on Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution (at the time of publication, the Special Committee
for Dispute Resolution) was created out of the Pound Revisited Conference of 1976.")
14. Spec. Comm. on Dispute Resolution, ABA Tactical Planning I (Jan. 1984) (unpublished
memorandum).
15. ABA SPEC. COMM. ON ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ABA BoardAp-
proves Three-Year Plan, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Spring 1982, at 1.
16. ABA SPEC. COMM. ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 13.
17. See Simonson, Tulsa's Project Early Settlement is ABA'"S First Choice, TULSA CTY. B. A.
NEws, April 1983, at 1.
[Vol. 20:114
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a third site."1
Tulsa was chosen as a site for a multi-door center because of its
"progressive legal system, its innovative Project Early Settlement Pro-
gram, and [its] energetic Mayor and Court Administrator."' 9 Project
Early Settlement was initiated in February, 1982, by the Municipal
Court of the City of Tulsa"° for the purpose of "utiliz[ing] mediation
and conciliation as alternative means to dispute resolution."'z  The
Project, which operates by training volunteers who then serve as out-
of-court mediators, 2 was established to channel less serious disputes of
a civil, criminal, consumer, housing or domestic conflict nature into
resolution by mediation as opposed to litigation.2 3 In the first eleven
months of the Project's operation, the program attracted seven hundred
cases, eighty-five percent of which were settled by the agreement of the
parties involved.24 Inasmuch as Tulsa's Multi-Door Program will be
aimed at referring similar types of disputes to alternative resolution
processes, Project Early Settlement is expected to be a major recipient
18. ABA Meeting of the Special Committee on Dispute Resolution, Los Angeles, Calif. (June
16, 1983) (unpublished memorandum). See also ABA SPEC. COMM. ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
supra note 13 (notes that, as of date of publication, Washington, D.C., Tulsa, and, Houston were
chosen as sites for Multi-Door Centers).
19. Speech by W. Riley, supra note 3.
20. ABA SPEC. COMM. ON ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Mediation Serv-
icesArailable in Oklahoma, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Spring 1982, at 6. The Project's first mediation
session was held on March 28, 1982, and full operations were developed by April, 1982. OK.
STATE UNIV. & CITY OF TULSA, OK., PROJECT EARLY SETTLEMENT-A REVIEW OF THE FIRST SIX
MONTHS, Introduction at 2 (1983). The Tulsa Municipal Court initially acted as coordinator of
the Multi-Door Center in Tulsa. ABA, Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Center, Tulsa, Oklahoma
4 (May 1983) (unpublished report). The Multi-Door Center is currently operated by the Tulsa
County Bar Association under the direction of Terry Simonson. Telephone call to Tulsa County
Bar Assoc. (Oct. 15, 1984).
21. Simonson, supra note 17, at 1.
22. See Simonson, supra note 17, at 1. By April, 1983, the Project had trained 130 volunteers
to serve as mediators. Id Initial training sessions were held in March and May, 1982, and in-
volved 25 and 40 participants, respectively. OK. STATE UNIV. & CITY OF TULSA, OK., supra note
20, at 9-10. Each session involves 20 hours of training, focusing on how to conduct the mediation
hearings, how to prepare a written agreement between the parties, and how to prepare comments
on the hearing for recordkeeping purposes. Id at 10-11.
23. See Simonson, supra note 17, at 1. Simonson notes that prior to the development of
Project Early Settlement, consumer, family, business, and neighborhood disputes were channeled
to small claims or misdemeanor courts. Mitchell, supra note 2, at 4. Thus, the Project "clears up
congestion for the cases that need to be there [the courts] and need to be dealt with in a timely
manner." Id. Studies compiled over the first six full months of operation show that 50% of Pro-
ject Early Settlement disputes involved money or property, 15% involved harassment and 15%
were termed "relationship" disputes. OK. STATE UNIV. & CITY OF TULSA, OK., supra note 20, at
18. Furthermore, 34% of the disputes involved neighbors, 33% were between consumers and
merchants and 12% were between "mates." Id. at 21.
24. Mitchell, supra note 2, at 4.
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 20 [1984], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss1/6
TULSA LAW JO U&AVAL [Vol. 20:114
of the Multi-Door Center's cases.
The choice of Houston and the District of Columbia as additional
sites for pilot multi-door centers was also influenced by those cities'
progress in the field of dispute settlement alternatives.26 Houston's
Neighborhood Justice Center handles approximately 350 cases per
month,27 and the District of Columbia has a variety of dispute process-
ing forums, including the D.C. Complaint Center and Mediation Serv-
ice and the Superior Court's Voluntary Civil Arbitration Program. 8
The pilot centers in the selected cities will follo,' three phases in
the implementation of the dispute resolution procedures. These phases
are estimated to take more than three years to complete.2 9 The first
phase of the Multi-Door Program is the development of Dispute
Screening and Diagnostic Centers,30 where trained intake counselors
will refer citizens to the most appropriate available dispute resolution
mechanism.3' The second phase of the project will encompass the crea-
tion or improvement of dispute resolution mechanisms within the com-
munity.32 In the third and final phase, the ABA will undertake a
25. ABA, Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Center, Tulsa, Oklahoma 4 (May 1983) (unpub-
lished report).
26. See Simonson, supra note 17.
27. ABA, Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Center, Houston, Texas 4 (August 1983) (unpub-
lished report).
28. ABA, Draft-District of Columbia Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Center 1 (Aug. 10,
1983) (unpublished memorandum on ABA Meeting of Spec. Comm. on Dispute Resolution, Los
Angeles, Calif., June 16, 1983).
29. Eder, Justice Department Backs Multi-Door Center, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Winter 1984,
at 1, 2.
30. ABA, Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Center, Tulsa, Oklahoma 3 (May 1983) (unpub-
lished report); see also Program May Settle Legal Disputes, Tulsa World, June 24, 1983, at 10, col.
4-5 ("The first phase of Multi-Door will be... 'diagnostic screening service[s],). . .where it will
be decided how best to resolve a problem."); Eder, supra note 29, at 2 (discusses three phases of
the Multi-Door Program). Phase one was initiated in Tulsa in April, 1984, by the opening of three
Citizen's Complaint Centers where trained Intake Specialists are available to screen complaints
and make referrals. Interview with Terry A. Simonson, Director of Tulsa Multi-Door Program
(June 25, 1984). These centers are located at the Better Business Bureau, for handling consumer
related disputes; the Police/Prosecutor Complaint Office, for referring disputes which are criminal
in nature; and KJRH's Channel 2 Troubleshooter, for handling a variety of complaints. Id.; see
also, Pilot Program Aimed at Easing Resolution ofDisputes, Tulsa Tribune, Feb. 15, 1984, at D. I,
col. 5-6 (intake specialists will refer complaints to Project Early Settlement, Small Claims Court,
the city prosecutor's office, or to social agencies). During the first phase of the multi-door pro-
gram, the ABA tentatively plans on operating the intake centers for 18 months as a "test of dispute
screening, diagnosis, and referral mechanisms." ABA, Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Center,
Tulsa, Oklahoma 5 (May 1983) (unpublished report). The first phase in Tulsa, Houston, and the
District of Columbia will be assessed by the Institute for Social Analysis. Eder, supra note 29, at 1.
31. ABA, Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Center, Tulsa, Oklahoma 4, 5 (May 1983) (unpub-
lished report); Eder, supra note 29, at 2.
32. ABA, supra note 31, at 3-4; Eder, supra note 29, at 2.
5
Welch: Mediation and Oklahoma's New Dispute Resolution Act
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1984
1984] DISPUTE RESOL UTION ACT
detailed evaluation of the Program.33
III. MEDIATION AND OKLAHOMA'S DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT
A. Mediation in General
Mediation is a process whereby a neutral party acts to facilitate the
resolution of a dispute.34 A mediator, however, lacks the power of a
judge or an arbitrator to make a binding decision for disputing par-
ties.35 As a result, the basic focus in mediation is to assist parties in
solving disputes among themselves.36
In accordance with the early development of mediation programs
in the United States, which were directed at the resolution of minor
disputes,37 Oklahoma's Dispute Resolution Act is aimed at less serious
disputes.38 Nonetheless, new efforts are being made to use mediation
as a tool in resolving major disputes, particularly in the areas of ra-
cial,39 environmental,4" and domestic confficts.41 This rapid increase in
33. ABA, Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Center, Tulsa, Oklahoma 4 (May 1983) (unpub-
lished report); accord Eder, supra note 29, at 2.
34. Rice, Mediation andArbritration as a Civil Alternative to the Criminal Justice System-An
Overview andLegalAnalysis, 29 Ahi. U.L. REV. 17, 21 (1979); BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 885 (5th
ed. 1979). See generally Cooke, Mediation: A Boon or a Bust, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 3 (1983)
(discussion of the benefits of mediation and the types of disputes most amenable to mediation);
Cooke, The Highways and Byways of Dispute Resolution, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 611 (1981) (discus-
sion of dispute resolution alternatives, including mediation, in the civil and criminal arena and
legislative means to facilitate such alternatives); Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S.
CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971) (discussion of the mediation function and the role of mediators);
Goldbeck, Mediation: An Instrument of Citizen Involvement, 30 Att. J. 241 (1975) (discussion of
mediation in relation to New York City's West Side Highway Project); Greason, Humanists as
Mediators: An Experiment in the Courts of Maine, 66 A.B.A. J. 576 (1980) (mediation of small
claims cases in Portland, Maine); Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29 (1982)
(discussion on role lawyers can play in mediation processes and potential problems of altering a
lawyer's traditional adversarial role); Smith, A Warmer Way of Disputing: Mediation and Concilia-
tion, 26 AMt. J. COMp. L. 205 (Supp. 1978) (presents reasons for the increase of mediation in the
United States).
35. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 29 & n.l (1982).
36. Id. at 34.
37. Id. at 31.
38. [M]any disputes arise between citizens of this state which are of small social or eco-
nomic magnitude and can be both costly and time consuming if resolved through a for-
mal judicial proceeding. Many times such disputes can be resolved in a fair and
equitable manner through less formal proceedings .... It is therefore the purpose of
this act to provide to all citizens of this state convenient access to dispute resolution
proceedings which are fair, effective, inexpensive, and expeditious.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1801 (Supp. 1983) (emphasis added).
39. Riskin, supra note 35, at 32 & n.29.
40. Id. For a discussion of various forms of environmental dispute resolution, see Bellman,
Bingham, Brooks, Carpenter, Clark & Craig, Environmental Conflict Resolution, ENVT'L CONSEN-
sUs I (Winter 1981). See also Schoenbrod, Limits and Dangers of Environmental Mediation: A
Review Essay, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1453 (1983) (critique of private parties attempting to resolve
6
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alternative methods of dispute resolution generally, and mediation spe-
cificaly,42 has, however, left unresolved a number of legal issues.
B. Confidentiality
One key issue in the field of mediation is whether or not the medi-
ation session itself should remain confidential. Professor Paul Rice
stated that "[w]ithout some assurance of confidentiality, prospective
participants may be reluctant to enter mediation/arbitration programs,
or to cooperate fully because of the fear that any statements they make
or information they provide will be used to their disadvantage in subse-
quent civil or criminal proceedings."43 Thus, a method of guaranteeing
confidentiality is essential in order to assure that all parties involved
are free to discuss any issues they feel are relevant without the concern
that discussions intended as confidential will later be used to their det-
riment.' The assurance of confidentiality should also aid in prevent-
ing the transformation of a mediation session from a resolution device
to a fact-finding expedition for a party intent on litigation,45 and in
preventing the use of mediation records as a means of prosecutorial
discovery in criminal mediations.46
The problem of confidentiality in mediation programs has already
environmental disputes through mediation); Straus, Mediating Environmental Disputes, 33 ARB. J.,
Dec. 1978, at 5 (discussion of benefits of using a facilitator in environmental disputes).
41. Riskin, supra note 35, at 32; see also Coombs, Noncourt-Connected Mediation and Coun.
seling in Child-Custody Disputes, 17 FAM. L. Q. 469 (1984) (sets forth various methods of mediat-
ing child custody disputes); Pearson & Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating Custody Disputes: A
Longitudinal Evaluation, 17 FAM. L. Q. 497 (1984) (analyzes short and long-term effects of the
Denver Custody Mediation Project); Comment, The Best Interest of the Divorcing Family-Media-
tion Not Litigation, 29 Loy. L. REV. 55 (1983) (discussion of Louisiana divorce law, domestic
relations mediation and ethical considerations of divorce mediation).
42. See generally Smith, A Warmer Way ofDiputing: Mediation and Conciliation, 26 AM. J.
COMp. L. 205 (Supp. 1978). Smith concludes: "The decade of the 1970's has provided the setting
for a remarkable series of developments that are changing the way in which Americans settle
disputes .... The emergence of. . .mediation centers and the extension of. . .mediation to
the settlement of disputes ... are, perhaps, the most dramatic of these developments." Id. at 205.
43. Rice, Mediation and Arbitration as a Civil Alternative to the Criminal Justice System-An
Overview and LegalAnalsis, 29 AM. U.L. REV. 17, 30 (1979).
44. See Friedman, Protection of Confldentiali y in the Mediation of Minor Disputes, 11 CAP.
U.L. REv. 181, 196 (1982).
45. Id. at 200. Friedman emphasizes this point and states:
If the parties know they will be unable to use facts acquired in the hearing in later
litigation, there will be less probing for such facts. This will free the hearing officer from
the fact finding tasks at an earlier point, and enable him or her to move on to the impor-
tant mediation phase of the hearing. If the parties speak freely in the hearing, it will also
aid the hearing officer in reaching a settlement.
Id.
46. Id. at 198-99.
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presented itself in several jurisdictions, particularly in relation to medi-
cal malpractice mediation.47 It has been argued that allowing a media-
tion panel's written conclusions into evidence at a subsequent trial or
permitting mediators to testify at a later trial usurps the jury's function
and, therefore, violates the plaintiff's right to a trial by jury under the
state's constitution.48 Other courts have admitted the findings of
mediators under the theory that the jury remains free to decide what
weight should be given to the panel's decision.4 9 Some courts have
47. See McCarthy v. Mensch, 412 So. 2d 343, 346 (Fla. 1982) (court held plaintiffs were not
denied right to a jury trial, to due process of law, or to equal protection by the trial court's admis-
sion into evidence of a medical malpractice mediation panel's written decision despite a later
ruling that the Flordia Medical Malpractice Act was unconstitutional); Davison v. Sinai Hosp. of
Baltimore, 462 F. Supp. 778, 781 (D. Md. 1978) (court held that the Maryland Health Care Mal-
practice Claims Act did not deprive claimants of a right to a jury trial despite the fact that the
findings of the arbitrators made prior to trial are presumptively valid at trial); Prendergast v.
Nelson, 199 Neb. 97,-, 256 N.W.2d 657, 666 (1977) (admitting medical review panel's report into
evidence does not unconstitutionally interfere with right to trial by jury); Halpern v. Gozan, 85
Misc. 2d 753, -, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744, 748-49 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (court allowed admission of a medical
malpractice panel's decision based on the premise that the jury was free to decide what weight
should be given to the panel's findings); Simon v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio App. 3d
164, -, 355 N.E.2d 903, 908 (1976) (court held Ohio's Medical Malpractice Act relating to com-
pulsory arbitration of medical malpractice claims was unconstitutional and the "arbitration provi-
sions ... which permit the introduction into evidence and exposure to the jury of the arbitrator's
decision, are a violation of the right to trial by jury.") See generally Freedman, Confidentiality: A
Closer Look, in ABA SPEc. COMM. ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ALTERNATIvE DISPUTE REsOLU-
TION: MEDIATION AND THE LAW: WILL REASON PREVAIL? 68 (L. Ray ed. 1983) (general outline
of confidentiality issues); Friedman, supra note 44 (discussion of issues of confidentiality and how
they relate to Night Prosecutor Program in Columbus, Ohio); Note, Medical Malpractice Media-
tion Panels: A Constitutional.Analysis, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 322 (1977) (survey of medical mal-
practice mediation legislation, and constitutional issues presented therein).
48. See, ag., Simon, 355 N.E.2d at 908 (use of panel's findings as evidence at a later trial
"effectively and substantially reduces a party's ability to prove his case, because that party must
persuade ajury that the decision of the arbitrators was incorrect, a task not easily accomplished in
view of the added weight which juries have traditionally accorded the testimony of experts.") See
also Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REv. 655, 681
(1976) ("At a subsequent trial, the prejudicial effect of an admissible, adverse panel report could
be virtually impossible to overcome, thus carrying over an unjust panel determination into a judg-
ment."); Note, supra note 47, at 331-32 ("While the effect of a divided panel's opinion may be
minimal, a unanimous decision may be considered controlling by the jury."). Inasmuch as the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases under the Constitution is not applicable to
the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, such arguments must be advanced under the appli-
cable state constitutional guarantees. See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1875).
49. See McCarthy, 412 So. 2d at 346; Prendergast, 256 N.W.2d at 666; Halpern, 381 N.Y. 2d
at 748-49. See also Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979). The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals would admit both the findings and testimony by the panel members under the
theory that the United States Supreme Court permits the admission of expert findings into evi-
dence at a jury trial. Id. at 1179-81. The Court of Appeals cited Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R.,
236 U.S. 412, 430 (1915), in which the Supreme Court permitted the findings and orders of the
Interstate Commerce Commission to be admitted as prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein in a suit to enforce a reparation award. Id. at 1180. The Circuit Court quoted from the
decision that "[the admission of the ICC's findings] interposes no obstacle to a full contestation of
all the issues, and takes no question of fact from either court or jury. . . . It does not abridge the
8
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gone so far as to grant such panel's findings a presumption of validity.50
At least one court has held that a mediator's findings or recom-
mendations are not admissible unless the mediator is available to tes-
tify as to the basis of the recommendation.' In McLaughlin v. Superior
Courtfor San Mateo County,52 the California Court of Appeals consid-
ered the constitutionality of the California Family Law Act 53 and, in
particular, rules of the Superior Court of San Mateo County, as they
related to the Act. The California Family Law Act requires prehearing
mediation of child custody and visitation disputes in marital dissolu-
tion proceedings.5 4 The Act, though providing for the confidentiality
of mediation proceedings, 5 leaves to local court rules the issues of ad-
missibility of a mediator's recommendation and availability of the me-
diator for cross-examination by the parties at a later hearing.56 The
defendant court exercised that option by adopting a policy which re-
quired that the mediator make a recommendation to the court if the
mediating parties failed to agree on child custody or visitation; by re-
quiring that the mediator not state his or her reasons for the recom-
mendation; and, because the basis of the recommendation had not been
disclosed to the court, by denying the mediating parties the right to
cross-examine the mediator.5 The Court of Appeals held that to per-
mit "the court to receive a significant recommendation on contested
issues [while denying] the parties the right to cross-examine its source"
was a denial of due process of law and, thus, a combination which
could not be constitutionally enforced.5
right of trial by jury, or take away any of its incidents." Id. (quoting Meeker v. Lehigh Valley
R.R., 236 U.S. 412, 430 (1915)).
50. See Davison, 462 F. Supp. at 781.
51. McLaughlin v. Superior Court for San Mateo Cty., 140 Cal. App. 3d 473, 189 Cal. Rptr.
479 (1983).
52. Id.
53. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-5174 (West 1983).
54. Id. § 4607(a) provides that:
[Where it appears on the face of the petition or other application for an order or modifi-
cation of an order for the custody or visitation of a child or children that either or both
such issues are contested... , the matter shall be set for mediation of the contested
issues prior to or concurrent with the setting of the matter for hearing.
(Emphasis added.) (Current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607(a) (West Supp. 1984)).
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607(c) (West Supp. 1984).
56. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4607(e) (West Supp. 1984), provides that "[t]he mediator may, consis-
tent with local court rules, render a recommendation to the court as to the custody or visitation of
the child or children." (Emphasis added.)
57. McLaughlin 140 Cal. App. 3d at 480, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
58. Id. at 480, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 485. See also Freedman, supra note 47, at 89-90 (discussing
McLaughlin and the desire to balance the need for confidentiality of hearings with the value to the
court of a mediator's recommendation). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Woods was not,
[Vol. 20:114
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Because the issue of confidentiality is in dispute, several alterna-
tives are available and should be carefully examined in order to protect
the confidentiality of mediation sessions. One alternative is to have the
parties enter into a written agreement not to litigate settlements
reached in mediation. 9 Such an agreement must, however, be made
on a voluntary basis and with full awareness and understanding of any
rights being waived.6" In jurisdictions involved in criminal mediation,
this written agreement/waiver should be augmented by an agreement
"signed by the prosecutor, promising not to seek out information from
the [mediation] program."'" These agreements may then prevent the
parties from using what was intended as confidential information
against each other and also prevent a prosecutor from obtaining access
to mediation records.
Mediators could further protect against forced disclosure by main-
taining no written records62 and thus avoid a subpoena of documentary
evidence.63  The lack of written records combined with evidentiary
rules on hearsay,' 4 which would possibly prevent the mediator from
testifying as to statements made during mediation, could keep a sub-
stantial portion of a session confidential. A lack of written records,
however, would deter the efficiency and continuity of a program and
hinder follow-up work on mediation settlements as well as research ef-
forts for the sake of the program.65 Furthermore, if statements made
however, concerned with this problem. Woods, 591 F.2d at 1179-81. The applicable statute in
Woods provided that:
[I]f any party rejects the decision of a mediation panel [under Florida's Medical Mal-
practice Law] he may institute litigation based on his claim in an appropriate court. The
panel findings are admissible into evidence in any subsequent litigation, but specific find-
ings of fact are inadmissible. . . . Panel members may not be called to testify as wit-
nesses concerning the merits of a case.
Id at 1168 (discussing FLA. STAT. § 768.47 (1977)). The court upheld the constitutionality of this
procedure stating that "[t]he panel finding is a particularly relevant, but not conclusive, form of
evidence." Id. at 1180. The court further held that "[t]he mere unavailability of panel members
for testimony at the subsequent trial does not render section 768.47 unconstitutional." Id.
59. See Friedman, supra note 44, at 203. Such an agreement may, however, present
problems in the event a resolution is reached in mediation but is later breached and the non-
breaching party then desires to litigate his mediation settlement. For a discussion of the enforce-
ment of mediation agreements, see infra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
60. See id. at 203-04. Friedman argues that such agreements, "like verbal expressions of
confidentiality, would probably have greater psychological than legal force." Id. at 204.
61. Id. at 202.
62. Prof. Rice points out that an additional problem in keeping mediation records confiden-
tial is the public's right of access to public documents and the "trend. . . toward policies that
favor and encourage access rather then impede it." Rice, supra note 34, at 77.
63. See Friedman, supra note 44, at 202.
64. See FED. R. EVID. 801.
65. See Friedman, supra note 44, at 202. Professor Rice notes that "[a]ccurate and compre-
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during mediation are construed as admissions against interest, such ad-
missions, which are not within the scope of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence definition of hearsay,66 would arguably be admissible in courts
which have adopted the Federal Rules.
Another means of protecting the confidentiality of mediation pro-
grams would be to treat the sessions and their outcome as offers to com-
promise.6" Federal Rule of Evidence 408, which prohibits the use of
"conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations,' 68 reverses
the common law rule which protected only the offer itself and not in-
dependent admissions of fact made during settlement negotiations.
69
For states which have adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 408, or a form
similar to it, mediation programs could gain protection under the
premise that mediation, though ideally not a pre-litigation process, fits
the rationale of an offer to compromise because it encourages settling
disputes without a trial.7"
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 offers still another possible method
hensive records are essential to the success of the programs, for without them completeand in-
formed service from intake through follow-up is jeopardized." Rice, supra note 34, at 76. Project
Early Settlement's procedures provide for a written mediator report of all sessions for follow-up
and evaluation purposes. OK. STATE UNIV. & CITY OF TULSA, OK., supra note 20, at XVI, The
report is recorded on a pre-printed form. Id. at XIX. Mediation agreements are also recorded on
a pre-printed form and maintained by the program. Id. at XVI-XVI. However, "[i]t is the policy
of Project Early Settlement to require the mediator to oversee the destruction of all notes taken by
the disputants at the mediation session" and "[t]he mediator is also to destroy his or her own
notes." Id. at XV-XVI.
66. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2).
67. See Friedman, supra note 44, at 204-07.
68. FED. R. EvID. 408 provides:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering
or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to com-
promise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to
prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or state-
ments made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible.
69. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 170 (2d ed.
1977). FED. R. EviD. 408 would still be somewhat limited in the scope of protection it provides as
it does not require the exclusion of offer to compromise evidence which is used for "proving bias
or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a
criminal investigation or prosecution." FED. R. EvID. 408.
70. The Domestic Relations Committee of the Civil Litigation Task Force in Alaska pro-
posed a rule ("Proposed Civil Rule 90.2") in October, 1983, which would permit court-ordered
mediation of divorce, child custody and visitation, and other domestic relations issues. ABA
SPEC. COMM. ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, LEGISLATION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 3 (1984). Pro-
posed Civil Rule 90.2 utilizes Alaska's evidence rule, which was patterned after FED. R. EVID. 408,
in its confidentiality provision. Id. at 12. Under the rule, all mediation proceedings would be
confidential and "deemed to be within the meaning of Evidence Rule 408." Id. Furthermore, a
proposal has been made to amend Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 408 to make specific reference
to mediation or dispute resolution services as constituting an offer or attempt to compromise a
disputed claim. Id. at 8.
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of protecting confidentiality.7' Rule 501 protects the privilege of per-
sons and witnesses according to the "principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light
of reason and experience. ' 72 Thus, if a problem of confidentiality arose
in a state law context, mediation programs could be protected by privi-
leges fashioned by a court or state legislature to protect pretrial diver-
sion processes or social workers, or by a privilege directed specifically
at mediation.73  By so creating a mediator privilege, no statements
made to the mediator intended to be used in the mediation process
could later be introduced as evidence in subsequent litigation.
Finally, legislation could be specifically tailored toward protecting
the confidentiality of a variety of dispute resolution programs.74 On
71. See Friedman, supra note 44, at 207-11.
72. FED. R. EVID. 501. Friedman points out that courts may rely on Wigmore's four condi-
tions to establish a privilege against the disclosure of communications. Friedman, supra note 44,
at 208-09. These conditions are:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed;
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory mainte-
nance of the relation between the parties; (3) The relation must be one which in the
opinion of the community ought to be sedulouslyfostered; and (4) The injury that would
inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the
beneft thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
J. WIGIORF., EVIDENCE § 2285 (2d ed. 1923). The first two factors are met because of the expecta-
tions of parties involved in mediation, particularly parties who have made written agreements not
to disclose information brought out in the mediation process. The third objective is supported by
the public policy in favor of mediation, including saving court time and encouraging the peaceful
resolution of disputes. The fourth factor would involve balancing the protection of a free and
open mediation program against the court's interest in having all available information to fairly
adjudicate a dispute. Courts may find that without the guarantee of confidentiality, however, a
mediation program would not gain the confidence of its participants and would, therefore, not
operate at its full potential.
73. Friedman, supra note 44, at 209. Friedman notes that the rationale for the limited protec-
tion available to social workers in some jurisdictions "clearly applies to the human relations coun-
selors on mediation program staffs." Id.
74. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307 (Supp. 1983), which provides:
Dispute resolution meetings may be closed at the discretion of the mediator. Mediation
proceedings shall be regarded as settlement negotiations, and no admission, representa-
tion, or statement made in mediation not otherwise discoverable or obtainable shall be
admissible as evidence or subject to discovery. In addition, a mediator shall not be sub-
ject to process requiring the disclosure of any matter discussed during mediation
proceedings.
See also MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.513(3) (West Supp. 1984-1985) (communications between
a domestic relations mediator and a party to the mediation or between the parties in the presence
of the mediator are privileged communications and shall not be admitted in evidence in any pro-
ceedings); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 849-b(6) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984) (unless otherwise provided in
the Community Dispute Resolution Centers Program Act, the work products of a mediator are
confidential, as are communications relating to the subject of the resolution made during the reso-
lution process); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.785 (1983) (all communications in child custody and visita-
tion dispute mediation proceedings shall be confidential; parties and individuals engaged in
mediation shall not be examined in civil or criminal actions as to communications, nor shall such
communications be used in civil or criminal actions without consent of mediating parties; excep-
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the federal level, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service gives
mediators a privilege by prohibiting them from producing documents
or from testifying in regard to mediation proceedings.75 The
Oklahoma legislature addressed the problem of confidentiality in the
Dispute Resolution Act by creating a privilege as to information re-
ceived by a mediator and by disclaiming that mediation records are
public.76 Section 1805 of the Act reads in part as follows:
A. Any information received by a mediator or a person employed
to assist a mediator, through files, reports, interviews, memo-
randa, case summaries, or notes and work products of the medi-
ator, is privileged and confidential.
B. No part of the proceeding shall be considered a matter of public
record.
C. No mediator, initiating party,77 or responding party7s in a medi-
ation proceeding shall be subject to administrative or judicial
process requiring disclosure of any matters discussed or shall
disclose any information obtained during any part of the media-
tion proceedings.79
Subsection A thus creates a mediator privilege, thereby alleviating
the need to rely on Oklahoma's Rules of Evidence which contain no
mediator, pre-trial diversion, or social worker privilege.80
A mediator's records are protected from public access through
subsection B of the Oklahoma Dispute Resolution Act. This provision
is particularly important because Project Early Settlement is coordi-
nated by the Municipal Court of the City of Tulsa,' and it could be
argued that its records should be characterized as public records. Pro-
fessor Rice states:
The characterization of the records of mediation/arbitration pro-
grams as public records will turn not only on the legal responsibility
of the programs to maintain records, their general recordkeeping
tions to testimonial privilege under Oregon law do not apply to communications made during
mediation; and all court records with respect to mediation shall be closed).
75. 29 C.F.R. § 1401.2(b) (1983); see also Friedman, supra note 44, at 204. Friedman ex-
plains that "[flederal mediators [in the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service] are prohib-
ited from producing documents or testifying concerning information obtained in the course of
their duties. Some exceptions to this rule may be made with written permission from the Director
of FMCS." Id.
76. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1805(A), (B) (Supp. 1983).
77. "Initiating party" is defined by the statute as the "party who first seeks mediation." Id.
§ 1802(1).
78. "Responding party" is defined by the statute as the "party who is named by the initiating
party as the other party in a dispute where mediation is sought." Id. § 1802(6).
79. Id. § 1805(A)-(C).
80. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 2501-2513 (1981).
81. OK. STATE UNIV. & CITY OF TULSA, OK., supra note 20, at 4.
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practices, and the attitude of the courts in the jurisdiction in ques-
tion, but also, and more fundamentally, on whether the programs
themselves are public agencies. . . . In making such a determina-
tion, courts undoubtedly will assess such factors as the source of their
funding, the nature of their powers, and the public character of the
responsibilities which they have undertaken, as reflected in their rela-
tionship to the courts and executive law enforcement agencies and in
their impact on legal rights and conventional "public proceedings." 82
Subsection B thus eliminates any questions which could arise concern-
ing the public nature of any written documents or reports which will
result from the mediation process.
Subsection C of the Act provides that participants in mediation
shall not disclose the information obtained in a mediation session in an
administrative or judicial process.83 This subsection, therefore, elimi-
nates the need to rely on Federal Rule of Evidence 408 or a written
agreement to prevent the disclosure of information obtained by the var-
ious parties during mediation.
Confidentiality of information obtained in mediation in
Oklahoma is not without its limit. Subsection F strips the mediator of
his privilege if one of the parties to the mediation "brings an action for
damages against a mediator arising out of mediation." 4 The scope of
this limitation must, however, be considered in conjunction with Sub-
section E which provides that civil actions against a mediator for state-
ments or decisions made during the process of mediation are limited to
actions which are a result of "gross negligence with malicious purpose"
or those taken in a "manner exhibiting willful disregard of the rights,
safety, or property of any party to the mediation."85
The mediator's privilege is further limited by the Oklahoma Rules,
Regulations and Guidelines for the Dispute Resolution Act which pro-
vide that:
The mediator shall disclose information to the proper agencies upon
learning that a child under the age of eighteen (18) years has had
physical injury or injuries inflicted upon him or her, by other than
accidental means, where the injury appears to have been caused as a
82. Rice, supra note 34, at 78. In fact, Project Early Settlement receives a major portion of its
funding from the Oklahoma Crime Commission and receives referrals from the Tulsa City Police
Department, the Tulsa City Prosecutor's Office and the Tulsa District Attorney's Office. OK.
STATE UNIV. & CiTy OF TULSA, OK., supra note 20, at 2, 5.
83. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1805(C) (Supp. 1983).
84. Id. § 1805(F).
85. Id. § 1805(E). See also infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (discussion of liability
under the Oklahoma Dispute Resolution Act).
1984]
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result of physical abuse or neglect.8 6
This limit, however, will rarely arise and should be of little or no conse-
quence to a party refusing to mediate for fear of losing confidentiality.
Despite these limitations placed upon the mediator's privilege,
Oklahoma's new Dispute Resolution Act will clearly aid Project Early
Settlement because of its straightforward confidentiality provisions. As
such, mediators and mediating parties will not have to rely on more
tenuous means to protect the confidentiality of discussions within medi-
ation and records produced as a result of mediation. All parties should,
therefore, be more willing to cooperate with and use the services avail-
able through the mediation program.
C. Enforceability
In addition to the problems related to confidentiality, additional
problems arise when the parties involved in mediation reach a settle-
ment with mutual obligations and incorporate those obligations into an
oral or written agreement which is subsequently breached by one or
more of the parties. Professor Rice suggests four options in the event of
breach of a mediation agreement.8 7 The first option is to ignore the
breach and let the parties proceed as they choose. 8 This would, how-
ever, diminish the effectiveness of the mediation and create inefficiency
in that the same dispute must then be channeled elsewhere for resolu-
tion. A second option is that, if parties are willing, the agreement can
be renegotiated in further mediation. 9 The second option is only use-
ful where the parties are cooperative, which is unlikely if one agree-
ment has already been breached. The third option involves the
revocation of participation in the mediation program, leaving the par-
ties to settle the dispute in litigation, through the criminal justice sys-
tem, or other administrative or judicial channels. 90 As with the first
86. Oklahoma Rules, Regulations and Guidelines for the Dispute Resolution Act, stpra note
I, at Rule VlII(B)(5)(a)(3). This rule mirrors the obligation of health care professionals and
"every other person" in Oklahoma who has knowledge of physical injuries inflicted upon a child
by abuse or neglect to report the matter to the Department of Human Services. OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, § 846 (1981). Furthermore, a mediator may be obligated to report the intention of a mediation
participant to commit a crime or any information necessary to prevent a crime. Though such a
provision is not currently encompassed in the Code of Professional Conduct for Mediators (see
Oklahoma Rules, Regulations and Guidelines for the Dispute Resolution Act, Rule VI1), such
information may be disclosed by an attorney, even when it is a client secret or confidence. OKLA.
STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 4-101(C)(3) (1981).
87. See Rice, supra note 34, at 26.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Seeid. Professor Rice points out that revocation of a defendant's participation in a crimi-
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option, this would not be the most efficient method of handling a
breach. Finally, the parties could attempt to enforce the agreement
reached in mediation.91 The advantage of this option is that it would
encourage the disputing parties to approach settlement seriously the
first time around and thereby promote efficiency. This fourth option,
however, raises additional issues concerning enforceability.
The agreement, pursuant to this fourth option, could be enforcea-
ble under a number of theories including contract,92 compromise and
settlement,93 accord and satisfaction,94 or arbitration,95 or could be
nal mediation program presents due process problems, with such due process rights arising from
the diversion process. Id. at 51. In State v. Lebbing, 158 N.J. Super. 209, 385 A.2d 938 (1978), the
New Jersey Superior Court held that a criminal defendant was entitled to the minimal require-
ments of due process before being terminated from a pretrial intervention program. Id. at 941.
The court based its reasoning on Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-84 (1972), in which the
Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant is entitled to due process protection prior to having
his parole revoked, and on Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), where the Court extended
this reasoning to probation terminations. Lebbing, 385 A.2d at 941. The court went on to hold
that the defendant was entitled to:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of the conditions of PTI [pretrial interven-
tion]; (b) disclosure to defendant of the evidence relied on; (c) the opportunity to be
heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to
confront and examine adverse witnesses; [and] (e) a statement of reasons for termination
by the presiding judge.
Id. at 942. The hearing does not, however, have to "implicate the 'full panoply' of due process
rights" since it is not a part of the criminal prosecution. Id (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480).
The same problems may present themselves in a mediation program where a criminal de-
fendant is referred to mediation prior to being prosecuted for an offense. If the parties fail to
come to an agreement, or an agreement is reached but it is claimed that the defendant breached
the agreement, the defendant would appear to be in a position to demand minimal due process
rights to protect his conditional liberty interest prior to being prosecuted on the original criminal
charges. Statutes providing for pretrial mediation of disputes do not appear to be addressing this
potential problem. Under Connecticut's statute, when a criminal mediation is successful, the pros-
ecutor is to enter a nolleprosequi and prosecution is to be terminated. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-56m.(b) (West Supp. 1984). If, however, the mediation is unsuccessful, or the defendant fails
to comply with the mediation agreement, prosecution of the defendant may be initiated. Id. § 54-
56m.(c). The statute does not expressly provide for the right of the defendant to a hearing. Like-
wise, under the Oklahoma statute, a defendant entering mediation is deemed to have waived his
right to a speedy trial, but the statute does not provide for any rights the defendant will have in the
event the mediation process fails. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1806 (Supp. 1983).
91. See Rice, supra note 34, at 26.
92. If a mediation agreement is entered into voluntarily and the agreement meets the legal
requirements of a valid contract, including consideration, the agreement would appear to be en-
forceable as a contract. See generally Freedman, Legal Issues in Mediation-Are Mediation Agree-
ments Enforceable? 5-9 (undated) (unpublished memorandum to ABA Spec. Comm. on Dispute
Resolution) (discussion of enforcement of mediation agreements under theories of general con-
tract law, compromise and settlement, and arbitration). Professor Rice argues that "[o]pposing the
enforcement of mediated or arbitrated contracts on the basis that enforcement converts a cause of
action in tort to one in contract intolerably exalts form over substance." Rice, supra note 34, at 28.
He goes on to note that the objective in mediation is to reach an agreement which remedies the
dispute and the technical means in which the remedy is given effect is irrelevant. Id.
93. Compromise and settlement is defined as "[an agreement or arrangement by which, in
consideration of mutual concessions, a controversy is terminated." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
16
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made enforceable by statute.96 The primary problem in the enforce-
ment of a mediation agreement would be the assessment of damages.
An award of money damages would undermine the goal of mediation,
i.e., the parties fashioning their own agreement to avoid a court-im-
posed solution.97 Furthermore, a question would arise as to whether
damages should be awarded based on the original dispute as opposed
to the self-imposed agreement which failed. 98
As an alternative to damages, specific performance, though a well-
suited remedial device for mediation agreements in some cases, could
prove difficult to enforce in others. First, the terms of the agreement
must be specific enough to be enforceable. 99 This presents a problem
260 (5th ed. 1979). Successful mediation results in an agreement to settle claims against each other
by mutual promises or performances and thus fits well within the definition of compromise and
settlement. Compromise and settlement agreements are upheld under the premise of encouraging
the private resolution of disputes over litigation. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 5
(1976).
94. In mediation involving the breach or possible breach of a former contract, the principle
of accord and satisfaction may come into play. If the mediation agreement constitutes a new
contract, and such contract is entered after the breach of a former contract, the mediation agree-
ment could be considered an "accord" and "the acceptance of it, or its performance in discharge
of the original contract," a "satisfaction." J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTs § 253, at 513
(2d rev. ed. 1974). If, however, the original contract had not yet matured, the mediation agree-
ment, under general principles of contract law, could be considered a substitute contract. Id.
Either way, "[i]t is now the law that a later, unperformed agreement, be it a technical accord or a
substitute contract, if it embodies the essential requisites of an informal contract, is legally en-
forceable." Id. at 515. Moreover, if it is the intent of the parties, the second agreement will
operate to discharge the parties' obligations under the prior contract. Id. Whether or not the
obligations under the first contract are discharged the moment the new contract is consummated
or when the new contract is fully performed will depend on the parties' intent. Id. at 515-16.
Generally, however, without "affirmative evidence of a contrary intention," it will be presumed
that the parties did not intend to exchange one cause of action for another, and, therefore, "it was
their intention that the old obligation should be discharged only on performance on the new." Id.
at 516. Thus, if the parties manifest an intent that upon entering the mediation agreement it is to
act as a discharge of all obligations under the previous contract, under the principles of accord and
satisfaction, the parties technically should be barred from suing under the first contract and held
instead to have only a remedy under the mediation agreement.
95. An arbitration award "is regarded as the judgment of a court of last resort. . . .and it
will be given full effect in any appropriate proceeding." 5 AM. JUR. 2d Arbitration and Award
§ 151 (1962). The major obstacle in applying this theory of enforcement to mediation agreements
is the fact that arbitrators have the power to make binding agreements for the disputants. See
supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. That mediators have no such power, however, may not
necessarily preclude a court from holding that the parties themselves have made the agreement
binding if the courts will construe the mediation agreement as a new and binding contract which
discharged any previous obligations between them.
96. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-22-308 (Supp. 1983) (written agreements approved by
the parties, their attorneys and the court, are enforceable as an order of the court); N.Y. JtD. LAW
§ 849-b(5)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1983-84) (the dispute resolution process under the Community
Dispute Resolution Centers Program Act is final and binding on the parties).
97. See Freedman, supra note 92, at 7.
98. Id.
99. "Specific performance or an injunction will not be granted unless the terms of the con-
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because mediators, though trained, are not necessarily attorneys °° and
therefore would not be versed in the drafting of contracts. Second, the
agreement must be of such a nature that money damages are inade-
quate and thus an equitable remedy is in order.101 Finally, the agree-
ment could not be unduly burdensome for a court to enforce and could
not require the court's constant supervision. 12 Since it is likely that the
mediation agreements would not be fashioned in a traditionally com-
mercial sense and may even involve commitments of a more personal
nature, court supervision could prove to be quite difficult. As a result,
awarding specific performance could prove to be totally inadequate for
the mediation process.
Oklahoma's statute leaves open the question of enforceability.
The statute, though prohibiting the admission of mediation discussions
or information obtained during mediation,103 does not expressly pro-
hibit the admission of a mediation agreement.1 4 Moreover, the statute
gives neither the mediator nor the mediation program the ability to
enforce an agreement,10 5 or to compel the disputants to re-mediate the
dispute if the initial agreement fails.'t 6
tract are sufficiently certain to provide a basis for an appropriate order." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 362 (1979).
100. Though Tulsa's Project Early Settlement has trained attorneys to serve as mediators, it is
the policy of the Project that mediators refrain from giving legal advice. OK. STATE UNIV. & CITY
OF TULSA, OK., supra note 20, at I I & Appendix E, at 18, Policy E13. The Project has also trained
housewives, law students, Department of Human Rights personnel, and volunteers from Tulsa
churches to serve as mediators. Id. at 11. Attorneys may serve as domestic relations mediators
under the Michigan Friend of the Court Act provided they have completed the training program
of the friend of the court administrative bureau. MICH. COMP. LAws ANNOT. § 552.513(4)(iv)
(West Supp. 1984-1985). For a discussion of the problems facing lawyers who mediate disputes,
see generally Riskin, supra note 34.
101. "It still continues to be the stated rule of law that specific performance of a contract will
not be decreed unless the remedy in money damages is an inadequate one." 5A CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 1139, at 109-10 (1964).
102. "A promise will not be specifically enforced if the character and magnitude of the per-
formance would impose on the court burdens in enforcement or supervision that are dispropor-
tionate to the advantages to be gained from enforcement and to the harm to be suffered from its
denial." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 366 (1979); see also 5A CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 1138, at 106 (1964) ("[A]lthough there may be no serious difficulty in compelling a
defendant to perform a non-continuing, ministerial act, such difficulty . . . often exists in the
specific enforcement of promises involving.., judgment. . . and honesty.")
103. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1805(C) (Supp. 1983).
104. Michigan's Friend of the Court Act expressly exempts domestic relations' mediation
agreements from its provisions on confidentiality so that such agreements may be incorporated
into a consent order. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.513(2), (3) (West Supp. 1984-1985). See also
OR. REv. STAT. § 107.765 (1983) (written mediation agreements in child custody and visitation
disputes are to be "incorporated in a proposed order or decree provision prepared for the court").
105. "No adjudication sanction or penalty may be made or imposed by the mediator or the
program." OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1805(D) (Supp. 1983).
106. Id.
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Section 1806 appears to favor revocation of the mediation agree-
ment with the parties being left free to pursue more traditional means
of dispute resolution based on the original complaint and not on the
breached mediation agreement. This section provides for the tolling of
any applicable civil statutes of limitation as to the mediation partici-
pants from the time they agree in writing to commence mediation" 7
until the mediation is officially terminated. 08 If the mediation involves
a criminal defendant, that defendant is deemed to have waived his
right to a speedy trial if he has consented to participate in mediation. 09
This section is apparently treating the mediation process as a kind of
formal settlement procedure: if the parties attempt and then fail to set-
tle their differences, their right to litigate is not thereby prejudiced.
This treatment, however, does imply that the mediation agreement it-
self is not enforceable.
Inasmuch as Oklahoma's Act does not adequately address the
problem of enforceability, the Act may not encourage the most efficient
handling of mediation agreements. Professor Rice argues that without
"enforcement procedures for non-compliance ..., an incongruous
situation is created where parties seeking relief are required to relitigate
their dispute in the costly, time-consuming, and sometimes unfair sys-
tem from which they had hoped to escape".I" In addition, parties who
may have already invested considerable time and energy in the media-
tion process and who may have even partially or fully performed their
part of an agreement may be forced to return to square one in order to
resolve their disputes.
Nonetheless, without a statutory provision governing the enforce-
ment of mediation agreements, the courts have more flexibility and can
thus decide the issues on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration
the nature of the dispute, the form of the agreement, and the method of
mediation, each of which has a bearing on what type of remedy is pref-
erable. As a result, the absence of enforceability provisions may not
prove to be a problem.
107. Section 1803 provides that the Administrative Director of the Courts is to promulgate
rules and regulations to effectuate the purpose of the Act. The rules are to include "[a] form for a
written agreement for participation in mediation." Id. § 1803(A), (C)(5).
108. Id. § 1806. Section 1803 also provides that rules are to include "[a] form for a written
record of the termination of mediation." Id. § 1803(C)(6).
109. Id. § 1806.
110. Rice, supra note 34, at 27.
[Vol. 20:114
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D. Liability of the Mediator
Another issue in the field of mediation is the extent of liability of a
mediator for his role in the mediation process. A mediator has no au-
thority to impose an agreement upon the parties but may play an active
role in helping the parties reach a settlement agreement and in putting
it in written form."1 ' Thus, a mediator may be placed in a position of
having his discretion questioned by the disputants. A party to the me-
diation could claim that the mediator exceeded his role by using coer-
cion, that he gave advice he was not qualified to give, or that he lost his
neutrality in conducting the session. 1 2 The extent to which a mediator
will be protected by his professional actions depends upon the nature
of the alleged wrongdoing, the available protective legislation in his
jurisdiction, and the various common law theories which may be ap-
plied to protect him.
One common law protective device is the qualified immunity
granted public officers and employees who are protected when exercis-
ing their discretionary duties without malice, bad faith or improper
purpose.11 3 The difficulty in applying this immunity to mediators,
however, would be determining whether the mediator, particularly one
who volunteers his time, is in fact a public officer or employee, 114 and if
111. "There are. . .enormous differences in procedures and in roles that mediators adopt.
Some will act merely as go-betweens, keeping open lines of communication. . . . Some
mediators will urge that the parties propose solutions; others will make their own propos-
als and try to persuade the parties to accept them and may even apply economic, social,
or moral pressure to achieve a "voluntary" agreement.
Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, supra note 34, at 35-36.
112. See Freedman, Legal Issues in Mediation-Are Mediators Liable for their Actions in Me-
diation? 2 (undated) (unpublished memorandum to ABA Spec. Comm. on Dispute Resolution).
113. In most states, "officials and employees enjoy no immunity at all for ministerial acts and
only a qualified immunity on matters calling for the officer's discretion." W. PROSSER & W. KEE-
TON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 132, at 1059 (5th ed. 1984). Discretionary acts are those
which "involve some fairly high level of policymaking." Id at 1060. Ministerial acts include
those which "create direct personal risks to others and acts involving ordinary considerations of
physical safety ... where there are no serious governmental concerns." Id Moreover, liability is
more likely to be found if a plaintiff has suffered physical injury, has been physically restrained or
has had his property subject to restraint "as an immediate result of official action." Id. at 1062.
"[C]ourts have been noticeably more reluctant to impose liability for many kinds of purely eco-
nomic loss which is unaccompanied by physical harm." Id at 1063. A claim that a mediator was
not neutral or exceeded his role either through coercion or by giving advice he was not qualified to
give, would not result in any physical harm to a disputing party, nor likely result in a restraint of
property and thus would probably not subject him to any liability. Furthermore, courts would not
favor holding a mediator liable if a disputing party was complaining of only an economic harm.
See generally Freedman, supra note 112, at 3-6 (discusses doctrine of qualified immunity and
concludes it would appear to be available to mediators in a great deal of cases).
114. A "public official" has been defined as one "among the hierarchy of government employ-
ees who have or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the
conduct of governmental affairs,"and "where a position in government has such apparent impor-
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determined to be so, whether in fact his duties are discretionary in na-
ture. It could be argued that although the mediator is not paid with
public funds, he is performing a function for the public and should,
therefore, be considered a public official. In addition, since a media-
tor's role involves more discretionary duties, such as choosing the most
appropriate means of controlling a mediation session, it appears that
the mediator would be protected when exercising his duties in good
faith. 115
Another possible common law protection would be to grant
mediators a quasi-judicial immunity," 6 a protection frequently af-
forded arbitrators.'t ' This immunity appears to more closely fit the
tance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the
person who holds it .. " Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101,1103 (Okla.
1978) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966)). The Dispute Resolution Act defines medi-
ator as "any person certified pursuant to the provisions of the Dispute Resolution Act to assist in
the resolution of a dispute." OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1802(3) (Supp. 1983). Under Section 1803 of
the Act, the Administrative Director of the Courts is to "promulgate rules and regulations, subject
to the approval of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, to effectuate the purpose of the
... Act." Id. § 1803. Such rules and regulations are to include "qualifications to certify
mediators". Id. This certification by the state may qualify the mediator as a public officer or
employee regardless of whether he receives compensation from the state.
115. The greater the possiblility that an officer's decision will adversely affect someone and the
range of free choice needed to effectively execute his job, are considerations in determining
whether or not an act is discretionary or ministerial. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 113,
at 1065. If it is likely that an officer will be unjustly sued for honest decisionmaking and yet it is
important that he be given more freedom in carrying out his duties, his acts will probably be
considered discretionary. Id However, where a duty is more specific, such as properly registering
a deed, it will more likely be considered ministerial and thus subject to liability if executed im-
properly. Id at 1066. The standards are difficult to apply to mediation, where the mediator is
granted considerable freedom in conducting a session yet technically is not engaged in decision-
making for the parties. Nonetheless, a mediator's responsibilities would more closely approximate
discretionary acts than specific duties.
116. Judges are generally granted an immunity as long as their acts are "'judicial' . . . in
nature and within the very general scope of their jurisdiction." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra
note 113, at 1057. This immunity is absolute and protects official acts even if they are executed "in
bad faith, or with malice or corrupt motives." Id Furthermore, "judicial immunity has been
extended to prosecuting attorneys, grand juries and a number of other adjuncts of the judicial
process." Id. at 1058. In Michigan, "friends of the court," who make written reports to the court
and to parties in domestic relations matters on issues of child custody, visitation and support, have
been granted a judicial immunity based on their quasi-judicial duties. Johnson v. Granholm, 662
F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1981). Freedman notes that judicial immunity might be extended to mediators
because they are closely associated with the judicial process and because "[t]he act of mediation
could be argued to be an integral part of the judicial process in those situations where mediation is
firmly established as a part of court operation." Freedman, supra note 112, at 7.
117. See, e.g., Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 117-18 (9th Cir. 1962) (court held that
architects acting as quasi-arbitrators were immune from suit providing they are acting in good
faith); Calm v. International Ladies' Garment Union, 311 F.2d 113, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1962) (court
held that appellee, while operating in the capacity of an arbitrator, was "clothed with an immu-
nity, analagous to judicial immunity, against actions brought by either of the parties arising out of
his performance of his.. . duties." (quoting Cahn v. International Ladies' Garment Union, 203
F. Supp. 191, 194 (E.D. Pa. 1962)); see also 6 C.J.S.Arbiration § 74 (1975) (arbitrators "cannot be
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role of mediator since he is clearly performing a quasi-judicial act.
Though mediators do not render judgments per se, their role is, in es-
sence, an extension of the judicial system since the ability to impartially
direct a dispute leads to its eventual resolution. The immunity given to
arbitrators would merely be extended one logical step further.
Oklahoma's Dispute Resolution Act saves the mediator from hav-
ing to rely on these various common law modes of protection. Section
1805(E) provides:
No mediator, employee, or agent of a mediator shall be held liable
for civil damages for any statement or decision made in the process
of mediating or settling a dispute unless the action of such person
was a result of gross negligence with malicious purpose or in a man-
ner exhibiting willful disregard of the rights, safety, or property of
any party to the mediation." 8
Thus, in Oklahoma, a mediator will not be liable for actions which
prove to be a breach of discretion or which do not rise above mere
negligence, involving no manifestation of malicious intent or willful-
ness.119 The mediator is therefore protected from a civil lawsuit for
malpractice unless his conduct is beyond negligence. At the same time
a disputing party is protected from the mediator acting beyond the
scope of his authority because the mediator has no means of enforcing
the agreement or forcing the parties to continue mediation.' 20 More-
over the disputants continue to have protection against any acts of
gross negligence.
IV. CONCLUSION
The proliferation of mediation programs in Oklahoma in the last
five years parallels a national concern to provide a more effective
means of handling disputes. ' 2' This national concern is reflected in the
held liable in damages to either of the parties for failure to exercise care or skill therein, or,...
are not liable for the actions taken in good faith. . . . In any event, immunity applies only to
action taken in the role of arbitrator.").
118. OKLA. STAr. tit. 12, § 1805(E) (Supp. 1983).
119. Id. Colorado's Dispute Resolution Act similarly limits mediator liability to misconduct
which is "willful or wanton." CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-22-306(2) (Supp. 1983).
120. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1805(D) (Supp. 1983).
121. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger noted this concern in his keynote address at the 1976
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice
by stating:
Ways must be found to resolve minor disputes more fairly and more swiftly than any
present judicial mechanisms make possible. . . . [T]here are few truly effective reme-
dies for such everyday grievances as usury, shoddy merchandise, shoddy services on a
TV, a washing machine, a refrigerator, or a poor roofing job on a home. . . . [L]awyers
19841
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ABA's formation of the Special Committee on Dispute Resolution and
that committee's development of the Mutli-Door Program. The choice
of Tulsa as a pilot site for this program, along with the already estab-
lished mediation programs operating in Oklahoma, may bring many
new issues regarding mediation and other means of dispute resolution
to the Oklahoma courts.
Oklahoma's new Dispute Resolution Act should provide a satis-
factory means of dealing with the legal issues of confidentiality in me-
diation sessions' 22 and mediator liability.'23 The enforceability of
mediation agreements, however, will remain an issue to be decided by
the courts, as the Act provides no clear guidelines on the subject. 124
Nonetheless, Oklahoma, through its adoption of the Act and its estab-
lishment of several programs, has made progress in the newly develop-
ing field of alternative means of dispute resolution.
Jane J Welch
must reexamine what constitutes practice of law, for if lawyers refuse minor cases on
economic grounds they ought not insist that only lawyers may deal with such cases.
70 F.R.D. 83, 93 (1976).
122. See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
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